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Earnings Management in the Aftermath of the Zero-Earnings Discontinuity 
Disappearance 
Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate earnings management by firms reporting a 
small profit or a small loss after the recent evidence that the discontinuity around zero earnings 
has disappeared.   
Design/methodology/approach: Using a large sample of US firms for the period 2002-2011, 
regression analysis and earnings distribution approach are employed to examine the earnings 
management of small profit and small loss firms in terms of both accruals management and 
real activities manipulation. 
Findings: The results suggest that both small profit and small loss firms are engaged in upward 
manipulation of accruals and real activities. This implies that failure to document a difference 
between firms to the right and left of zero by prior studies is not due to small profit firms not 
managing earnings, but rather this is more attributable to loss firms engaging in upward 
manipulation. Furthermore, it is indicated that the discontinuity around the distribution of 
earnings change has also recently disappeared as firms reporting a small earnings decrease 
demonstrate similar earnings management behavior to those reporting a small earnings 
increase. 
Research limitations/implications: This study is subject to the measurement error which is a 
common limitation in the earnings management literature. 
Practical implications: The results suggest that the users should be aware that, in addition to 
firms that meet benchmarks by a slight margin, firms narrowly missing benchmarks are also 
involved in earnings management.  
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Originality/value: This study shows that the disappearance of the discontinuity around zero 
earnings and zero change in earnings should not be interpreted as a sign of no earnings 
management. It also explains how earnings management could have contributed to the 
disappearance of the discontinuities in earnings distribution. 
Keywords: financial reporting, earnings management, accruals management, real activities 
manipulation, earnings distribution, earnings discontinuity  
Jel classification: M41   
1. Introduction 
Detection of earnings management has long been the subject of heated debate in the accounting 
literature. In order to uncover earnings manipulation, a common methodology is to associate it 
with a motivation for earnings management. Earnings management induced by management 
compensation packages (e.g. Healy, 1985; Skinner, 1993; Baker et al., 2003; Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005), debt contracts (e.g. Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeny, 1994; Dichev and 
Skinner, 2002; Gupta et al., 2008), targets set by industries (e.g. Beaty et al., 1995; Petroni, 
1992), earnings benchmarks (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; 
Daske et al., 2006; Gunny, 2010; Das et al., 2009), and cost of capital (e.g. Dechow et al., 1996; 
Strobl, 2013; Kim and Sohn, 2013) is established in the literature. For decades, the attempts to 
document earnings management had substantially focused on accruals and discretionary 
accruals, but a study by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) embarked on a different route. Instead 
of calculating discretionary accruals to observe earnings management, they employed natural 
earnings benchmarks such as avoiding reporting of losses and earnings decreases in order to 
uncover earnings manipulation. Through this approach, manipulation of earnings is inferred 
from the pattern of earnings distribution. To this end, the frequency of earnings level or 
earnings change scaled by a size variable such as total assets or market value is plotted and 
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observations are grouped into intervals according to their level of scaled net income. Any 
distributional irregularity is considered as evidence of earnings management. The only 
assumption here is that “under the null hypothesis of no earnings management, the cross-
sectional distribution of earnings changes and earnings levels are relatively smooth” 
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997, p. 102). Simply stated, it is generally expected that in the absence 
of earnings management the distribution of earnings would be symmetric. Therefore, if 
earnings are manipulated to reach an earnings target, it is expected that there will be “too few” 
frequency of earnings sitting just below the target and “too many” at or above it (Degeorge et 
al., 1999).  
Comparing discretionary accruals of small profit and small loss firms, Dechow et al. (2003) 
report that the discontinuity in the earnings distribution cannot be associated with accruals 
management. Hansen (2010) points out that the reason behind earnings management not 
differing between small loss firms and small profit firms could be that loss avoidance is not the 
only motivation for earnings management and that incentives other than reporting positive 
earnings, such as to meet/beat analysts’ forecasts or to continue reporting earnings growth, 
could also encourage earnings management. He provides evidence that firms that missed a loss-
avoidance benchmark apply accruals management to meet other earnings targets. Koh et al. 
(2008) examine earnings management to meet or beat market expectations and suggest that 
after Enron and the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the market has become more suspicious 
of firms meeting/beating earnings benchmarks. The authors show that beating an EPS 
benchmark by a small margin has also declined in the post-Enron era.  
Evidence of a change in earnings management behaviour after the passing of the Act is 
abundant in the literature (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Lobo & Zhou, 2010) which highlights the 
monitoring role of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting (e.g. Dechow et 
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al., 1996; Garcia-Meca & Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009; Leventis & Dimitropoulos, 2012; Neifar et 
al., 2016). A recent study by Gilliam et al. (2015) may be a turning point in studies that use the 
earnings distribution approach. They reveal that the discontinuity around zero in earnings 
distribution has faded after the accounting controversy at the turn of the twentieth century. 
They examine competing hypotheses including the effect of scaling (e.g. Durtschi & Easton 
2005, 2009), sample selection (e.g. Durtschi & Easton 2005 and 2009; Burgstahler & Chuk, 
2015) and effects of income taxes and special items (Beaver et al., 2007) suggesting that these 
factors can explain neither the discontinuity nor its fade. However, they do not directly examine 
earnings management around zero earnings after the disappearance of the discontinuity. 
Moreover, while they document the disappearance of the discontinuity and indicate that non-
earnings management factors cannot explain this phenomenon, they do not provide evidence 
how earnings management could explain it. The present study fills this gap by providing 
evidence on earnings management around zero earnings in terms of both accruals management 
and real activities manipulation. We explain how the recent decline in benchmark-beating 
earnings management could have contributed to the disappearance of the discontinuity. 
Looking into both types of manipulation is particularly significant since in order to fully 
understand earnings management behaviour one should investigate both means of 
manipulation (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005) and there has been a shift from accruals 
management to real activities manipulation in the aftermath of high-profile accounting scandals 
at the turn of the century (Cohen et al., 2008). Moreover, this study provides fresh evidence on 
the discontinuity in the distribution of earnings changes to investigate the existence or 
otherwise of the discontinuity reported by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). 
Using a large sample of US firms for the period 2002-2011, the present study examines 
earnings management around zero earnings and zero change in earnings. In doing so, scaled 
earnings are plotted and observations just above and below zero are selected and compared 
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with the rest of the sample in terms of various measures of earnings management. Providing 
corroborative evidence that the discontinuity around zero has recently vanished, we find that 
firms reporting a small loss and those reporting a small profit are similar in terms of earnings 
management behaviour as both groups are generally engaged in upward manipulation. The 
evidence on change in earnings is also consistent with the fade of the discontinuity and similar 
earnings management behaviour is observed for firms located to the right and left of zero 
change. 
The present study makes several contributions to the earnings management literature. Firstly, 
while Dechow et al. (2003) indicate that small profit firms do not differ from small loss firms 
in terms of abnormal discretionary accruals, our findings suggest that the two groups are also 
similarly engaged in real activities manipulation. We argue that the lack of difference between 
the two groups might not be due to a lack of earnings management by small profit firms. 
Instead, this might be attributable to similar behaviour by small loss firms. This is not in line 
with the notion that small loss firms are less likely to be engaged in earnings management 
because they would need a slight effort to shift from reporting a small loss to reporting a small 
profit (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Kerstein & Rai, 2007). Roychowdhury (2006) reports that 
small profit firms are engaged in income-increasing manipulation of real activities. 
Considering the evidence on a relatively recent change in earnings management behaviour 
(Cohen et al., 2008) and the more recent disappearance of the kink in the earnings distribution 
(Gilliam et al., 2015), this paper examines earnings management in the post-Enron era by 
looking into both accruals management and real activities manipulation. The results indicate 
that small loss firms show almost the same level of upward real activities manipulation as small 
profit firms. This similarity could be because small loss firms are also engaged in upward 
manipulation rather than being due to small profit firms not managing their earnings. This 
suggest that while the recent intensified scrutiny over firms that just beat benchmarks have 
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reduced beating benchmarks by a small margin, at the same time it has created a quiet room 
for some other manipulators to avoid the attention of outsiders by stopping just behind 
benchmarks and marginally missing them. Secondly, this paper expands the findings of Gilliam 
et al. (2015) regarding the disappearance of zero-earnings discontinuity to indicate that the 
discontinuity in the distribution of earnings change which was initially documented by 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) has also recently disappeared. The results reveal that firms with 
a small earnings decrease are engaged in similar upward manipulation as firms with a small 
earnings increase. Thirdly, given concentrating on one tiny interval limits the power of tests 
(Roychowdhury, 2006) and the immediate right of zero has long been considered as the interval 
most likely to contain earnings management, our results suggest that firms located across a 
wider area around zero earnings, both to the right and left of zero, are engaged in earnings 
management. This could potentially increase the power of tests in future studies taking the 
earnings distribution approach which offers a methodological contribution to the earnings 
management literature. Fourthly, consistent with the reported recent shift from accruals 
management to real activities manipulation (Cohen et al., 2008), we provide evidence that firms 
around zero earnings exhibit a remarkably greater level of real activities manipulation 
compared to accruals management. A similar inference can be made regarding firms around 
zero change in earnings.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys prior studies and develops 
research hypotheses. Section 3 explains sample and research design. The results are presented 
in Section 4 and, finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
As Holthausen (1990) points out, opportunistic behaviour, information signalling and 
efficiency contracting perspectives are capable of explaining earnings management. However, 
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self-centred and opportunistic behaviour of management assumed by agency theory is the 
standard approach used by accounting scholars to explain earnings management (Walker, 
2013). To assess the financial performance of firms, investors and other market participants 
focus on benchmarks rather than absolute values. This tendency can be explained by prospect 
theory. In contrast to utility theory which assumes that rational decision makers weight the utilities 
of outcomes by their probabilities, according to prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), they actually view outcomes as gains or losses not as the absolute value of wealth. 
They argue that in order to define gains or losses a reference point is required which could be 
earnings benchmarks such as zero earnings or expected earnings. Since outsiders focus on 
achieving earnings benchmarks to assess the financial success of firms, beating benchmarks is 
important for managers. Opportunist managers may avoid missing earnings benchmarks by 
means of earnings management. Thus, in order to detect earnings manipulation, studies tend to 
concentrate on firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks to see whether they are involved 
in manipulation.  
If earnings are managed for the purpose of reaching a benchmark then there must be an 
unusually high number of cases that just meet the benchmark and an unusually low number of 
cases just missing it, causing a so-called “kink” in the earnings distribution. This anomaly, or 
kink, in the distribution of earnings is well documented in the literature. Looking into avoiding 
a loss as a common earnings benchmark, Hayn (1995) was one of the first to notice a 
discontinuity in earnings distribution around zero. Firms that incurred a small loss could report 
a small profit through a slight manipulation of their earnings. Although the difference between 
a small loss and a small profit could be insignificant, due to the so-called ‘cognitive reference 
point’, a small profit is perceived as abnormally larger compared to a small loss (Van 
Caneghem, 2002). Loss avoidance earnings management should be evident where there are an 
abnormally large number of firms that have just surpassed zero earnings along with an 
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abnormally small number of firms reporting a loss, giving rise to a discontinuity in the 
distribution of earnings. Therefore, the immediate right of zero has been deemed the interval 
most likely in which to find firms engaged in earnings management. To observe earnings 
management from earnings distribution, one first needs to understand the shape of the 
distribution without earnings management. Hayn (1995) defines the expected frequency of 
earnings as a normal distribution at 1% significance level using a binominal test. She plots 
earnings and notices a point of discontinuity around zero with a concentration of observations 
at the immediate right of zero and an abnormally low number of observations of small losses. 
She interprets the kink as being indicative of firms that are about to experience a loss crossing 
“the red line” by engaging in earnings manipulation.  
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examine earnings management applied to avoid earnings 
decreases and reporting a loss. They operationalize distribution smoothness as where the 
expected frequency of observations in each interval is the average of the number of 
observations in its two neighbouring intervals. They observe an abnormal pattern in the 
distribution of earnings change and of earnings level and suggest two explanations for their 
findings. The first of these is avoiding losses and earnings decreases to reduce transaction costs 
with stakeholders, and the second suggested explanation is a natural reluctance toward absolute 
and relative losses. Beaver et al. (2003) plot the distribution of earnings scaled by total assets 
with interval widths of 0.006. Similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), the expected 
frequency of an interval is considered as the average of the two neighbouring intervals. They 
also find a discontinuity in the earnings distribution around zero. In a similar vein, Degeorge 
et al. (1999) indicate how thresholds including loss avoidance, prior period earnings and 
analysts’ forecasts induce certain patterns in earnings distribution. Burgstahler and Eames 
(2006) provide evidence that firms avoid missing analysts’ forecasts by means of both accruals 
management and real activities manipulation. Using quarterly data, Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) 
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also observe discontinuities around zero and prior year earnings. A very recent study by 
Halaoua et al. (2017) investigates British and French firms in terms of earnings management 
around zero and earnings change and finds evidence of earnings management by both groups, 
although they find that the frequency of, and the motivations for, benchmark meeting/beating 
are different across the two settings. 
An advantage of the earnings distribution approach is that it enables researchers to make 
predictions about the frequency of earnings which is likely caused by the discretionary portion 
of earnings (McNichols, 2000). Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that the earnings distribution 
approach captures the effect of real activities manipulation with cash flow effects such as R&D 
or advertising reduction that may not be captured using accrual approaches. This is because, 
under this approach, instead of accruals, earnings are plotted which contain both accruals and 
cash flows. In addition, this approach enables researchers to assess the prevalence of earnings 
management behaviour. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence of the pervasiveness 
of earnings management to avoid a loss or earnings decrease.  
However, some researchers have cast doubt on the idea that earnings management explains the 
kink. Durtschi and Easton (2005, 2009) provide evidence of alternative explanations for 
discontinuity in earnings distribution including the deflation effect, sample selection criteria, 
the difference between characteristics of profit and loss observations, and a combination of 
these explanations. They suggest that because of these effects, the discontinuity pattern cannot 
be regarded as actual evidence of earnings management. Beaver et al. (2007) indicate that the 
asymmetric nature of certain earnings components contributes to the discontinuity in earnings 
distribution. They further demonstrate that higher tax rates for profit firms can push them 
toward the interval just above zero, and that negative special items push loss firms away from 
zero.  
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In order to determine whether earnings management can explain the kink in the earnings 
distribution, Dechow et al. (2003) focus on discretionary accruals to examine whether or not 
small profit firms have higher discretionary accruals compared with two other groups: (1) all 
other firms and (2) small loss firms. If earnings management is the driver of the kink, it is 
expected that small profit firms have higher discretionary accruals relative to small loss firms. 
They argue that small loss firms are expected to have discretionary accruals similar to all other 
firms since there might be no reason for earnings management to report a smaller loss. Their 
empirical evidence suggests that small profit firms show higher discretionary accruals than 
other firms, but small loss firms indicate the same amount of positive discretionary accruals as 
small profit firms. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that earnings management causes 
the kink. They could not confirm that discretionary accruals are the key driver of the anomaly 
in earnings distribution around zero and recommend caution when using the kink interval as a 
measure of accruals management. They propose some alternative explanations for the kink 
including real activities manipulation to shift from reporting a loss to reporting a profit. 
Building on this finding, Roychowdhury (2006) provides evidence of real activities 
manipulation by small profit firms. He selects an interval on the immediate right of zero as the 
most likely to contain firms engaged in earnings management than other firms providing 
evidence that they manipulate sales, production and expenses to avoid reporting a loss. While 
Roychowdhury (2006) focuses on earnings management by small profit firms, Siriviriyakul 
(2013) compares real activities manipulation of small profit and small loss firms and finds no 
difference between them. 
More recent studies have examined the competing hypotheses about drivers of the 
discontinuity. Donelson et al. (2013) investigate the effect of earnings management on the kink 
around earnings benchmarks. Using a sample of firms with restated earnings due to an alleged 
GAAP violation, they plot the earnings of the firms before and after restatement to show 
11 
 
whether there is a kink around three earnings benchmarks including analysts’ forecasts, prior 
year earnings and zero. At the first two benchmarks, they observe no discontinuity when 
restated earnings are plotted but they do witness a significant discontinuity when initial 
earnings are plotted. At zero earnings, they find evidence of discontinuity for both initial and 
restated earnings. Their evidence is collectively consistent with earnings management around 
the benchmarks.  
There is evidence that good governance could mitigate benchmark-driven earnings 
management. Dechow et al. (1996) find that a weak governance structure increases the 
likelihood of earnings management. Klein (2002) indicates that US firms with stronger 
corporate governance as measured by board and audit committee independence are less 
engaged in accruals management. Using a sample of firms incorporated in the United Kingdom, 
Peasnell et al. (2000) provide evidence that earnings management to avoid reporting a loss or 
earnings decrease has declined in the post-Cadbury period. Bartov and Cohen (2009) 
investigate benchmark-beating earnings management in the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act era and 
provide evidence that the frequency of such manipulation has decreased since the passing of 
the Act. More recently, Gilliam et al. (2015) examine the kink around zero earnings before and 
after the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US for the period 1976-2012. They observe 
that the discontinuity is evident in virtually every year before 2002, i.e. the year in which the 
Act was passed, but it disappears after the implementation of the Act. They then looked further 
into other explanations for the kink than earnings management and reported that factors 
including scaling, selection bias, tax effect and special items could not explain the kink before 
2002 and nor could they explain its subsequent disappearance. Overall, their results suggest 
that the kink cannot be attributed to the non-earnings-management factors suggested by 
Durtschi and Easton (2005) while they do not provide any compelling evidence on why the 
kink has disappeared.  
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We build on the recent evidence by Gilliam et al. (2015) and investigate earnings management 
in the vicinity of zero earnings in the aftermath of the kink’s disappearance. Upward earnings 
management by firms with a pre-managed earnings that is just behind an earnings target has 
been documented by prior studies (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Roychowdhury, 2006). While there is evidence that beating 
benchmarks by a narrow margin has decreased in the post-Enron era because the market has 
become more suspicious of such behaviour (Koh et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009), the 
opportunity to turn a small loss into a small profit by means of earnings manipulation could be  
still tempting. This is because a firm with a small pre-managed loss can report positive earnings 
using a slight upward manipulation. The benefits of such manipulation may justify its costs 
because of its trivial magnitude. We argue that this expectation is still valid in the post-Enron 
era. Therefore, firms just behind zero earnings are expected push their earnings up in order to 
shift from a small loss to a small profit. This forms our first hypothesis:  
H1: Other things being equal, firms with a small profit exhibit upward earnings management. 
The evidence that there is more concern about benchmark-beaters could mean that the market 
would probably be less worried about the firms that miss earnings benchmarks. This in turn 
increases the possibility of upward earnings manipulation by firms with a pre-manged loss 
because they can improve their earnings up to just behind zero earnings. This way they can 
report a very small loss with less risk of attracting outsiders’ attention. Therefore, given the 
decline in benchmark-beating earnings management (Bartov and Cohen, 2009) and the recent 
evidence of the disappearance of the discontinuity around zero earnings (Gilliam et al., 2015), 
we conjecture that the fade of the kink could be, at least to some extent, due to upward earnings 
management by small loss firms. Such a reduction would narrow the gap between the number 
of small loss and small profit firms which results in the vanishment of the kink. That being the 
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case, it is expected that small loss firms are also involved in income-increasing earnings 
management, shaping our second research hypothesis: 
H2: Other things being equal, firms with a small loss exhibit upward earnings management.    
3. Research Design 
3.1. Sample  
The sample includes all US firms in DataStream for the period 2002-2011 which amounts to 
54,059 firm-year observations. Firm-years with insufficient data and operating in regulated 
industries (SIC codes 4400-4999) and financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6499) are removed 
from the sample. Earnings management models are run cross-sectionally for every year and 
industry, where industries are identified by two-digit SIC codes. In doing so, every industry-
year group is required to have at least 15 observations and groups with insufficient observations 
are deleted. The final sample after considering all these conditions contains 23,524 firm-years 
with 4,098 unique firms from across 52 industries. All the continuous variables are winsorized 
at 1 percent in order to reduce the impact of outliers.  
3.2. Measures of Earnings Management 
Cross-sectional models suggested by Roychowdhury (2006), i.e. abnormal cash flows from 
operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, are employed to 
measure real activities manipulation. These measures have been used very extensively by 
earnings management studies since their introduction. The residual from the following model 
is used as abnormal cash flow from operations: 
CFO௧/A௧ିଵ ൌ α଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺܵ௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅ αଷሺᇞ S௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	 ε௧         (1) 
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Where CFO୲ is cash flow from operations in year t; S୲	sales in year t; ∆S୲	is change in sales 
from year t-1 to year t; and A୲ିଵ is lagged total assets. 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are measured using the following equation: 
DE௧/A௧ିଵ ൌ α଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺܵ௧ିଵ/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	 ε௧         (2) 
Where DE୲ is the sum of R&D, advertising, and selling, general and administrative expenses 
in year t. 
As Roychowdhury (2006) points out, manipulation of production can affect reported earnings 
by changing the amount of fixed costs absorbed by each unit of product. He defines production 
costs as the sum of change in inventory and cost of goods sold and suggests the following 
model to capture abnormal production costs: 
PC௧/A௧ିଵ ൌ α଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺܵ௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅ αଷሺᇞ S௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αସሺᇞ S௧ିଵ/A௧ିଵሻ ൅ ε௧         
(3) 
Where PC୲ is production costs in year t and ∆S୲ିଵ is change in sales from year t-2 to year t-1. 
Finally, Jones model (1991) is run to measure accruals management: 
AC௧/A௧ିଵ ൌ α଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺᇞ ܵ௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅ αଷሺPPE௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	 ε௧         (4) 
Where AC୲ is the total accruals defined as the difference between earnings and cash flow from 
operations in year t and PPE୲ is gross property, plant, and equipment in year t. 
Dechow et al. (1995) argue that Jones (1991) model ignores the possibility that revenue itself 
might be manipulated, and suggest that change in receivables should be deducted from change 
in revenues in the accruals model. To examine whether or not the results are sensitive to the 
15 
 
use of the modified Jones model, the following regression is also run to measure accruals 
management: 
AC௧/A௧ିଵ ൌ α଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺሾᇞ ܵ௧ െᇞ ܴܧܥ௧ሿ/A௧ିଵሻ ൅ αଷሺPPE௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	 ε௧        (5) 
Where ∆REC୲	is net receivables in the year t less net receivables in year t-1. 
 
3.3.Empirical Model 
In order to test whether, and to what extent, firms in the intervals to the right and left of zero 
are involved in earnings management, each measure of earnings management is separately 
regressed on an indicator variable that denotes if the observation belongs to the interval in 
question. To this end, the following pooled cross-sectional model 1  with a year indicator 
variable is run: 
ܧܯ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙଵሺܵܫܼܧሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶሺܯܶܤሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷሺܰܫሻ௧ ൅ ߙସሺܫܰܶܧܴܸܣܮሻ௧ ൅ ∑ ߙହ,௝௝ ܻ݁ܽݎ௝ ൅
ߝ௧          (6) 
Where EM is the earnings management measure and INTERVAL is an indicator variable that 
is set equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the interval suspected of manipulation and 0 
otherwise. Equation (6) is separately run for the intervals to the right and left of zero to test the 
research hypotheses. When testing H1 (small profit firms) INTERVAL is set to be 1 if the 
observation belongs to the interval to the immediate right of zero earnings, and when testing 
H2 (small loss firms) it is set to be 1 if the observation belongs to the interval to the immediate 
left of zero.  
                                                            
1 Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012), pooled cross sectional regression is used because this 
study examines independent observations that exhibit a certain behaviour, i.e. firm-years that have reported a 
small profit or a small loss, and compare them with the rest of observations. 
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Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012), size, growth and performance are 
controlled for. SIZE is the logarithm of the lagged market value of equity, MTB is lagged market 
to book ratio, and NI is net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged assets. Although 
there are well-known exceptions, large firms, compared with small firms, are generally 
expected to have less earnings management since they tend to have stronger corporate 
governance systems in place (e.g. better internal control and bigger auditors) which makes 
earnings management more costly for them. Thus, the coefficient on SIZE is expected to be 
negative. Performance is controlled for using the return on assets ratio. Dechow et al. (1995) 
argue that earnings management models that ignore performance may be biased and that not 
considering performance may interfere with statistical inferences from earnings management 
models. Since by definition net income is the sum of operating cash flows and accruals, it is 
expected that NI is positively related to abnormal operating cash flows and abnormal accruals. 
Firms in different stages of the business cycle vary by future growth opportunities. Firms with 
a high growth rate are expected to have a higher working capital and are also more likely to 
engage in earnings management (McNichols, 2000). Therefore, the variation in earnings 
management measures that is attributable to growth is not discretionary and should be 
controlled for (Collins et al., 2017). Growth firms are expected to have growing positive 
income and hence are not expected to be in the vicinity of zero earnings which would result in 
a negative coefficient on MTB.   
 
4. Results 
4.1. Earnings Distribution around Zero 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of net income scaled by lagged assets with an interval width 
of 0.005 for the range -0.25 to +0.35 (120 intervals). Lagged assets are used to scale earnings 
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so that any anomaly around zero could not be attributed to market capitalisation 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). As can be seen in the figure, there is no obvious discontinuity around 
zero. When the number of observations in the intervals are considered, as Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) suggest, the normal frequency of observations in each interval is expected to be 
the average of the number of observations in its two adjacent intervals. The number of 
observations in the interval to the immediate right of zero is 352 which is very close to the 
average number of observations in the intervals just before and after the interval to the 
immediate right of zero i.e. 363.5. This signifies the lack of anomaly around zero and is in 
agreement with the results reported by Gilliam et al. (2015) who suggest that the discontinuity 
around zero has disappeared in the post-Enron era.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 compare firms in the intervals left and right of 
zero with the rest of the sample. When total assets and the market value of equity are 
considered, small loss firms are smaller in size than both the rest of the sample and small profit 
firms. Interestingly, small loss firms also show higher cash flow from operations, production 
costs and discretionary expenses. However, the difference between small loss and small profit 
firms disappears when the variables are scaled by total assets which suggests that the difference 
between the two groups could be attributable to their size. In terms of market to book value, 
both groups are quite similar and represent substantially lower growth than the rest of the 
sample. Total accruals for the whole sample is negative and this is also the case for small loss 
and small profit firms; while small loss firms show substantially more absolute numbers than 
small profit firms which again could be attributable to their size as the difference is not 
observed when scaled levels are compared. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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4.2. Comparison of Intervals Right and Left of Zero 
This section examines whether firms located in the vicinity of zero earnings are engaged in 
upward manipulation of earnings. Figure 2 provides a closer look at the intervals around zero 
earnings. The intervals are defined with the width of 0.005 for the range of -0.075 to +0.075 
(30 intervals). This is consistent with the methodology taken by Roychowdhury (2006) to select 
observations suspected of earnings management; however, instead of only focusing on the right 
of zero, we examine earnings management for firm-years located in the two intervals left and 
right of zero (separated by the dashed line). Based on this, 432 firm-years are located in the 
interval to the immediate right of zero and 352 firm-years are located in the interval to the 
immediate left of zero.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Equation (6) is run separately for each of the five measures of earnings management, i.e. 
abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary 
expenses and abnormal accruals using Jones and modified Jones models. Table 2 reports the 
results of the main regression model for observations in the two intervals left and right of zero. 
Consistent with the research hypotheses, abnormal production costs indicate income-increasing 
earnings management by both small loss and small profit firms as the coefficient on INTERVAL 
is positive and significant for both groups. As Roychowdhury (2006) points out, firms can 
overproduce to allocate their fixed production overheads over a larger number of units which 
results in an equivalent decrease in fixed cost absorbed by each unit sold and hence an increase 
in earnings. The result for discretionary expenses is also in agreement with upward earnings 
management predicted in H1 and H2 as both intervals have abnormally lower discretionary 
expenses compared with the rest of the sample. Likewise, albeit of much less magnitude, the 
coefficient for accruals is generally suggestive of similar income-increasing manipulation by 
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both groups. This is comparable to the results reported by Dechow et al. (2003) that small loss 
firms indicate the same amount of positive discretionary accruals as small profit firms. The 
magnitude and significance of accruals management in the right of zero is greater than the left 
of zero. This is consistent with Barua et al. (2006) who indicate that profit firms are more likely 
to use accruals management than loss firms. However, the negative coefficients for abnormal 
cash flow from operations, which are marginally significant, are not in line with income-
increasing manipulation predicted by the research hypotheses as firms located in both intervals 
exhibit abnormally lower cash flow from operations than the rest of observations. This could 
be due to the prominent inverse relationship between discretionary accruals and cash flow from 
operations (Dechow et al., 1995) since “positive accruals increasingly are necessary to meet an 
earnings target as operating cash flows diminish” (Houmes and Skantz, 2010, p. 63). The 
results for the control variables are generally consistent with our expectations as SIZE and MTB 
show a negative sign for most of the measures and NI is positively associated with abnormal 
accruals and abnormal cash flow from operations. 
The results for the interval right of zero is also consistent with those of Roychowdhury (2006) 
who examine income-increasing real activities manipulation by firms that narrowly beat the 
zero earnings benchmark. However, he hypothesises that suspect observations are expected to 
show an unusually low cash flow from operations while given the direct relationship between 
earnings and cash flows from operations, any income-increasing earnings management is 
expected to result in an unusually high cash flow from operations and an inverse relationship 
cannot be interpreted as a sign of upward manipulation. Abnormally lower cash flow from 
operations of firms around zero earnings could be due to their operational features which needs 
further investigation. In any case, the coefficients on the two other measures of real activities 
manipulation, namely abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, are 
considerably larger than those of accruals management measures. This is in line with the 
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findings of Cohen et al. (2008) that suggest a recent shift from accruals management to real 
activities manipulation in the aftermath of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. By and large, interestingly 
enough, both small profit firms and small loss firms show very similar earnings management 
behaviour which indicates that the methodology taken by prior studies comparing the two 
groups to infer earnings management could lead to false conclusions.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.3. Earnings Distribution around Earnings Change 
While Gilliam et al. (2015) only examine the prominent discontinuity around zero earnings, 
this paper, in addition to reporting corroborative evidence on zero earnings discontinuity, 
provides fresh evidence on the previously observed discontinuity in the distribution of earnings 
change (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Figure 3 shows the distribution of change in net 
income scaled by lagged assets with an interval width of 0.005 for the range -0.25 to +0.35 
(120 intervals). In line with the evidence on the disappearance of zero earnings discontinuity, 
the figure indicates that there is no obvious discontinuity around earnings change either. The 
number of observations in the interval to the immediate right of zero earnings change is 1030 
which is close to the average number of observations in the two neighbouring intervals i.e. 
1055. The symmetric distribution of earnings change is similar to that of earnings which 
demonstrates that the discontinuity around zero earnings change has also disappeared in the 
post-Enron era. These results are consistent with the expectation that beating benchmarks by a 
small margin has declined in the post-Enron era as the market has become more suspicious of 
such behaviour (Koh et al., 2008).  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
21 
 
Table 3 compares firms in the intervals left and right of zero earning change with the rest of 
the sample. Both firms with a small increase and a small decrease in earnings are generally 
larger than the rest of the sample and show lower growth. This implies that larger, more mature 
firms report more stable financial results. And while firms with a small decrease in earnings 
are generally larger, both groups show very similar cash flow from operations, production 
costs, discretionary expenses and accruals when the items are scaled by total assets.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.4. Comparison of Intervals Right and Left of Zero Earnings Change 
This section explores whether and how firms located in the vicinity of zero change in earnings 
are involved in earnings management. Equation (6) is re-run to compare earnings management 
of firms located in the interval to the immediate right (left) of zero change with the rest of the 
sample, with INTERVAL being equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the group of firms with 
a small increase (decrease) in earnings and zero otherwise. The model is separately run for each 
of the five earnings management measures. The results reported in Table 4 are generally 
comparable to those of firms neighbouring zero earnings. Both groups indicate income-
increasing earnings management as the coefficient on INTERVAL is significant and positive 
for abnormal production costs and accruals and negative for abnormal discretionary expenses. 
The results for abnormal cash flows from operations lack significance. Similar to small profit 
firms and small loss firms which both exhibit consistent upward earnings management, the 
analogous results for firms located to the right and left of zero earnings change further indicate 
that comparing the two groups to draw inferences with regards to earnings management could 
be misleading. It also suggests that firms that just miss their last year earnings could be as likely 
to be engaged in earnings management as those beating their last year performance by a small 
margin.  
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.5. Alternative Definition of Earnings Intervals 
Earnings distribution studies tend to merely focus on one interval, i.e. the one just above an 
earnings target, while other intervals may also contain earnings management. Jacob and 
Jorgensen (2007, p. 388) note that “earnings management is not confined to the immediate 
vicinity of earnings thresholds but is discernible over broader sections of earnings and earnings 
change histograms”. Partial identification of firms likely to be engaged in earnings 
management weakens the power of tests. To examine whether the results are sensitive to the 
interval width used in this study to pick firms suspected of earnings manipulation, instead of 
the interval width prevalent in the literature (i.e. 0.005) which was applied in the initial results, 
double the initial width is used and Equation (6) is re-run for both firms located in the intervals 
to the right and left of zero earnings. Figure 4 shows the intervals based on the width of 0.01. 
The revised width more than doubles the number of observations sitting in the two intervals of 
interest as the number of observations in the interval to the right and left of zero rises to 1006 
and 784, respectively.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Table 5 reports the results when the width of earnings intervals is 0.01. For firms reporting a 
small profit, the coefficients on the variable of interest, i.e. INTERVAL, shows dramatic 
improvement in terms of both significance and magnitude when they are compared with the 
initial results. The results for small loss firms are also consistent with the initial findings yet 
the magnitude of the coefficients generally declines. While this suggests that firms located in 
a wider area around zero are engaged in income-increasing earnings management, 
manipulators with a small loss seems to be more densely located in the vicinity of zero earnings 
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than those with a small profit. In any case, these findings indicate that widening the width of 
intervals can generally improve the power of the tests. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study provides more insight into a recent finding by Gilliam et al. (2015) concerning the 
disappearance of zero-earnings discontinuity after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We 
suggest that benchmark-beating earnings management could have contributed to the 
disappearance of the discontinuity. Given the evidence that benchmark-driven manipulation 
has decreased due to the recent market scepticism about beating benchmarks by a slight margin 
(Koh et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009) which implies less attention is attracted by firms 
that miss earnings benchmarks, firms with a pre-manged loss or earnings decrease could enjoy 
a quiet room to improve their earnings up to just behind earnings benchmarks. That is, 
restricting benchmark-beating earnings management could have two effects: (1) a decrease in 
the frequency of beating benchmarks by a small margin, and (2) an increase in the frequency 
of missing benchmarks by a small margin. This in turn could narrow the gap between the 
number of small profit and small loss firms resulting in the fade of the discontinuity. Therefore, 
the disappearance of the discontinuity could be due to upward earnings management by small 
loss firms. Our findings are consistent with this and suggest further that small loss firms and 
small profit firms show a very similar earnings management behaviour both in terms of 
accruals management and real activities manipulation. This finding also explains why prior 
studies could not find any significant difference between accruals management of small profit 
and small loss firms (Dechow et al., 2003). Despite the prevalent notion in the literature that 
small loss firms are less likely to manipulate earnings, they are actually not. In other words, 
failure to document a difference between firms to the right and left of zero is not due to small 
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profit firms not managing their earnings, but it is instead due to small loss firms being similarly 
engaged in upward manipulation. Thus, comparing small profit firms and small loss firms to 
infer earnings management could lead to false conclusions. Furthermore, the disappearance of 
the kink should not be interpreted as a sign of no earnings management by firms around zero 
earnings since they are involved in upward manipulation. Another implication of our study for 
future research on benchmark-driven earnings management is that while researcher have 
traditionally focused on the interval just to the right of earnings targets, they should look into 
both sides in the vicinity of earnings targets and use wider intervals. Moreover, this paper 
provides new evidence on earnings management to avoid earnings decreases, suggesting that 
the prominent discontinuity around zero earnings change, observed by Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), has also recently disappeared. We show that firms reporting small earnings decreases 
exhibit similar earnings management behaviour to those with small earnings increases 
indicating that comparing the firms located around zero earnings change could also lead to 
false earnings management inferences.  
The fact that earnings management is observed in both presence and absence of the kink calls 
into question that the kink was initially created by earnings management. Therefore, the 
disappearance of the kink should not be interpreted as no earnings management by firms 
located in the vicinity of zero earnings and zero change in earnings. While the main driver of 
the discontinuity in the earnings distribution remains an open question, our results suggest that 
the users should be more mindful of firms that narrowly miss benchmarks as they are likely to 
manipulate their earnings in the quiet room created by fixation on benchmark-beaters. While 
prior studies (e.g. Koh et al., 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009) suggest that the market have 
become more vigilant of marginal benchmark-beaters, shareholders, analysts and auditors 
should also pay special attention to firms marginally missing earnings targets since they could 
also be engaged in earnings manipulation. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of earnings intervals. 23,524 firm-years are grouped into 120 earnings intervals with a width 
of 0.005 for the range from -0.25 to +0.35. Earnings are defined as net income before extraordinary items scaled 
by lagged total assets.  
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Figure 2. Frequency of observations around zero earnings. Firm-years are grouped into 30 earnings intervals with 
the width of 0.005 for the range from -0.075 to +0.075.  
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Figure 3. Distribution of change in annual earnings. 23,524 firm-years are grouped into 120 intervals with the 
width of 0.005 for the range from -0.25 to +0.35. Change in earnings is defined as the difference between current 
and last year net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets.  
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Figure 4. Frequency of observations around zero earnings using alternative definition of intervals. Firm-years are 
grouped into 15 earnings intervals with the width of 0.01 for the range from -0.075 to +0.075.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Zero Earnings 
Variable 
Whole sample Left of Zero Right of Zero 
Small Loss Firms Rest of Sample Small Profit 
Firms 
Rest of Sample 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
S ($ 
million) 
7277.39 312.43 12900 464.38 7192.76 309.37 5838.69 310.72 7304.31 312.50 
A ($ 
million)  
7553.19 419.03 15200 796 7437.54 413.64 7379.62 626.63 7556.44 414.85 
MV $ 
(million) 
2923.45 365.09 1654.05 349.78 2942.68 365.22 1317.42 257.37 2953.50 367.07 
MTB 3.25 1.74 1.68 1.18 3.27 1.75 1.66 1.18 3.28 1.76 
CFO ($ 
million) 
635.02 30.70 728.80 30.66 633.60 30.72 410.01 26.63 639.23 30.80 
PC ($ 
million) 
4847.36 180.64 8787.05 265.67 4788.57 179.10 4468.75 178.52 4854.21 180.683 
DE ($ 
million) 
1421.62 65.52 2659.44 83.34 1403.01 65.37 1105.26 48.08 1427.37 65.77 
AC ($ 
million) 
-294.33 -15.31 -756.94 -32.91 -287.32 -15.02 -391.93 -25.32 -292.51 -15.15 
NI ($ 
million) 
340.55 10.72 -28.14 -1.61 346.13 11.64 18.09 1.00 346.58 11.49 
S/A 1.13 0.91 0.91 0.67 1.13 0.92 0.89 0.72 1.13 0.91 
CFO/A 0.07 0.085 0.052 0.051 0.07 0.086 0.055 0.052 0.07 0.09 
PC/A 0.80 0.57 0.71 0.45 0.80 0.57 0.69 0.49 0.80 0.57 
DE/A 0.32 0.24 0.21 0.16 0.33 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.33 0.25 
AC/A -0.07 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.07 -0.054 -0.053 -0.049 -0.07 -0.05 
 
* This table presents the mean, median and standard deviation of the variables used in the models for small loss 
and small profit firms and the rest of the sample as well as the whole sample. 
** To lessen the effect of outliers, all of the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 percent tails. 
*** Variable definitions: 
S = net sales or revenue  
A = total assets 
MV = market value of equity 
MTB = market to book ratio in current year 
CFO = cash flow from operations 
PC = production costs for year t as the sum of inventory change and cost of goods sold 
DE = discretionary expenses as sum of selling, general, and administrative expenses, advertising 
expenses, and research and development expenses 
AC = total accruals as net income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations 
NI = net income before extraordinary items 
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Table 2: Comparison of Intervals Right and Left of Zero with the Rest of the Sample 
(Interval width= 0.005) 
Variabl
es 
Left of Zero Interval  Right of Zero Interval 
Cash 
flow 
from 
operati
ons 
Produc
tion 
costs 
Discretio
nary 
expenses 
Accrua
ls using 
Jones 
Accrua
ls using 
modifie
d Jones 
Cash 
flow 
from 
operati
ons 
Produc
tion 
costs 
Discretio
nary 
expenses 
Accrua
ls using 
Jones 
Accrua
ls using 
modifie
d Jones 
Interce
pt 
0.0001 -
0.0010 
0.005 -
0.0001 
-
0.0001 
0.0001 -
0.0009 
0.0003 -
0.0002 
-
0.0001 
SIZE 0.0032
* 
-
0.0040
* 
0.00007 -
0.0226
*** 
-
0.230*
** 
0.0031
* 
-
0.0040
* 
-
0.00002
*** 
-
0.0226
*** 
-
0.0230
*** 
MTB 0.0004 -
0.0011
** 
0.0014*
** 
-
0.0002 
-
0.0002 
0.0004 -
0.0011
*** 
0.0014*
** 
-
0.0002 
-
0.0002 
NI 0.3757
*** 
-
0.1571
*** 
-
0.2646*
** 
0.3556
*** 
0.3568
*** 
0.3757
*** 
-
0.1572
*** 
-
0.2645*
** 
0.3556
*** 
0.3568
*** 
INTER
VAL 
-
0.0083
** 
0.0322
*** 
-
0.0358*
** 
0.0084
** 
0.0071 -
0.0085
* 
0.0268
*** 
-
0.0248*
** 
0.0096
*** 
0.0086
* 
* This table reports the coefficients from the following regression: 
ܧܯ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙଵሺܵܫܼܧሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶሺܯܶܤሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷሺܰܫሻ௧ ൅ ߙସሺܫܰܶܧܴܸܣܮሻ௧ ൅෍ߙହ,௝
௝
ܻ݁ܽݎ௝ ൅ ߝ௧  
The above model is run separately for each model. EM stands for earnings management measures including 
abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal 
accruals using the Jones and modified Jones methods which are residuals from the following regressions.  
CFO௧/A௧ିଵ ൌα଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺܵ௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅αଷሺᇞ S௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	 ε௧          
DE௧/A௧ିଵ ൌα଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺܵ௧ିଵ/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	 ε௧          
PC௧/A௧ିଵ ൌα଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺܵ௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅αଷሺᇞ S௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αସሺᇞ S௧ିଵ/A௧ିଵሻ ൅ ε௧  
AC௧/A௧ିଵ ൌα଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺᇞ ܵ௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅αଷሺPPE௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	 ε௧   
AC௧/A௧ିଵ ൌα଴ ൅	αଵሺ1/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	αଶ		ሺሾᇞ ܵ௧ െᇞ ܴܧܥ௧ሿ/A௧ିଵሻ ൅αଷሺPPE௧/A௧ିଵሻ ൅	 ε௧         
T statistics, reported in parentheses, are generated using Newey-West procedure to correct for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity. 
** Variables are as previously defined. 
*, **, *** represent that the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Earnings Change  
Variable 
Whole sample Left of zero earnings change Right of zero earnings change 
Firms with small 
decrease in 
earnings 
Rest of Sample Firms with small 
increase in 
earnings 
Rest of Sample 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
S ($ 
million) 
7277.39 312.43 18600 564.28 6763.48  302.98 7343.57 568.17 7273.68 299.32 
A ($ 
million)  
7553.19 419.03 18500 1097.70 7053.68 398.28 8732.58 1261.82 7487.08 389.98 
MV $ 
(million) 
2923.45 365.09 3707.64 759.1 3040.07 376.09 3965.33 920.96 3018.95 371.5 
MTB 3.25 1.74 2.16 1.58 3.29 1.75 2.17 1.59 3.31 1.76 
CFO ($ 
million) 
635.02 30.70 1386.28 83.45 600.78 29.25 803.29 95.38 625.59 28.54 
PC ($ 
million) 
4847.36 180.64 12300 363.78 4517.92 173.89 5552.67 339.79 4809.67 173.40 
DE ($ 
million) 
1421.62 65.52 3949.5 90.20 1307.82 64.85 1678.76 107.84 1407.51 64.28 
AC ($ 
million) 
-294.33 -15.31 -572.91 -39.85 -281.63 -14.54 -401.39 -40.11 -288.33 -14.32 
NI ($ 
million) 
340.55 10.72 813.37 31.17 319.01 9.93 401.90 39.11 337.11 9.47 
S/A 1.13 0.91 0.99 0.77 1.13 0.92 0.94 0.74 1.14 0.92 
CFO/A 0.07 0.085 0.089 0.081 0.069 0.086 0.091 0.088 0.068 0.085 
PC/A 0.80 0.57 0.76 0.54 0.80 0.57 0.71 0.50 0.80 0.57 
DE/A 0.32 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.33 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.33 0.25 
AC/A -0.07 -0.054 -0.046 -0.041 -0.070 -0.055 -0.045 -0.044 -0.071 -0.551 
 
* This table presents the mean, median and standard deviation of the variables used in the models for small loss 
and small profit firms and the rest of sample as well as the whole sample. 
** To lessen the effect of outliers, all the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 percent tails. 
*** Variables are as previously defined. 
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Table 4: Comparison of Intervals Right and Left of Zero Earnings Change with the 
Rest of the Sample (Interval width= 0.005) 
Variab
les 
Left of zero change Right of zero change 
Cash 
flow 
from 
operat
ions 
Produ
ction 
costs 
Discreti
onary 
expense
s 
Accru
als 
using 
Jones  
Accru
als 
using 
modif
ied 
Jones 
Cash 
flow 
from 
operat
ions 
Produ
ction 
costs 
Discreti
onary 
expense
s 
Accru
als 
using 
Jones  
Accru
als 
using 
modif
ied 
Jones 
Interce
pt 
0.0000
3 
-
0.0015 
0.0014 -
0.000
3 
0.000
08 
-
0.0002 
-
0.0014 
0.0013 -
0.000
3 
-
0.000
9 
SIZE 0.0032
* 
-
0.0044
* 
0.0005 -
0.022
7*** 
-
0.023
0*** 
0.0031
* 
-
0.0043
* 
0.0005 -
0.022
7*** 
-
0.231
*** 
MTB 0.0004 -
0.0011
** 
0.0014*
** 
-
0.000
2 
-
0.000
2 
0.0004 -
0.0011
*** 
0.0014*
** 
-
0.000
2 
-
0.000
2 
NI 0.3757
*** 
-
0.1574
*** 
-
0.2641*
** 
0.355
5*** 
-
0.356
8*** 
0.3756
*** 
-
0.1574
*** 
-
0.2641*
** 
0.355
5*** 
0.356
8*** 
INTER
VAL 
-
0.0009 
0.0270
*** 
-
0.0387*
** 
0.007
4*** 
-
0.000
9 
0.0035 0.0179
*** 
-
0.0274*
** 
0.006
1*** 
0.006
3* 
* This table reports the coefficients from the following regression: 
ܧܯ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙଵሺܵܫܼܧሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶሺܯܶܤሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷሺܰܫሻ௧ ൅ ߙସሺܫܰܶܧܴܸܣܮሻ௧ ൅෍ߙହ,௝
௝
ܻ݁ܽݎ௝ ൅ ߝ௧  
The above model is run separately for each model and EM stands for earnings management measures including 
abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal 
accruals using the Jones and modified Jones methods. T statistics, reported in parentheses, are generated using 
Newey-West procedure to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
** Variables are as previously defined. 
*, **, *** represent that the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Suspect Firms with the Rest of the Sample (0.01 width) 
Variab
les 
Left of Zero Interval  Right of Zero  
Cash 
flow 
from 
operati
ons 
Produc
tion 
costs 
Discretio
nary 
expenses 
Accrua
ls 
using 
Jones 
Accrua
ls 
using 
modifi
ed 
Jones 
Cash 
flow 
from 
operati
ons 
Produc
tion 
costs 
Discretio
nary 
expenses 
Accrua
ls 
using 
Jones 
Accrua
ls 
using 
modifi
ed 
Jones 
Interce
pt 
0.0002 -
0.001
2 
0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0004 
SIZE 0.0032
* 
-
0.004
1* 
0.00007 -
0.0226
*** 
-
0.0230
*** 
0.0031
* 
-
0.0039
* 
-0.0001 -
0.0225
*** 
-
0.0229
*** 
MTB 0.0004 -
0.001
1*** 
0.0014*** -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0004 -
0.0011
*** 
0.0014**
* 
-0.0002 -0.0002 
NI 0.3757
*** 
-
0.157
0*** 
-0.2646*** 0.3556
*** 
0.3568
*** 
0.3757
*** 
-
0.1572
*** 
-
0.2644**
* 
0.3555
*** 
0.3567
*** 
INTER
VAL 
-
0.0096
*** 
0.028
9*** 
-0.0311*** 0.0073
** 
0.0057
* 
-
0.0094
*** 
0.0327
*** 
-
0.0340**
* 
0.0116
*** 
0.0109
*** 
* This table reports the coefficients from the following regression: 
ܧܯ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙଵሺܵܫܼܧሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶሺܯܶܤሻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷሺܰܫሻ௧ ൅ ߙସሺܫܰܶܧܴܸܣܮሻ௧ ൅෍ߙହ,௝
௝
ܻ݁ܽݎ௝ ൅ ߝ௧  
The above model is run separately for each model. EM stands for earnings management measures including 
abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal 
accruals using the Jones and modified Jones methods. T statistics, reported in parentheses, are generated using 
the Newey-West procedure to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
** Variables are as previously defined. 
*, **, *** represent that the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
